wdiff rfc5553.original rfc5553.txt

Networking
Network Working Group A. Farrel (Ed.)
Internet-Draft Farrel, Ed.
Request for Comments: 5553 Old Dog Consulting
Intended Status:
Category: Standards Track R. Bradford
Created: March 7, 2009
JP. Vasseur
Expires: September 7, 2009
Cisco Systems, Inc.

RSVP

Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) Extensions for Path Key Support

draft-ietf-ccamp-path-key-ero-04.txt

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Abstract

The paths taken by Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) and
Generalized MPLS (GMPLS) Traffic Engineering (TE) Label Switched
Paths (LSPs) may be computed by Path Computation Elements (PCEs).
Where the TE LSP crosses multiple domains, such as Autonomous Systems
(ASes), the path may be computed by multiple PCEs that cooperate,
with each responsible for computing a segment of the path.

To preserve confidentiality of topology within each AS, the PCEs
support a mechanism to hide the contents of a segment of a path (such
as the segment of the path that traverses an AS), called the
Confidential Path Segment (CPS), by encoding the contents as a Path
Key Subobject (PKS) and embedding this subobject within the result of
its path computation.

This document describes how to carry Path Key Subobjects in the
Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) Explicit Route Objects (EROs)
and Record Route Object Objects (RROs) so as to facilitate confidentiality
in the signaling of inter-domain TE LSPs.

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

1. Introduction

Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) and Generalized MPLS (GMPLS)
Traffic Engineering (TE) Label Switched Paths (LSPs) are signaled
using the TE extensions to the Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP-TE) (RSVP-
TE) [RFC3209], [RFC3473]. The routes followed by MPLS and GMPLS TE
LSPs may be computed by Path Computation Elements (PCEs) [RFC4655].

Where the TE LSP crosses multiple domains [RFC4726], such as
Autonomous Systems (ASes), the path may be computed by multiple PCEs
that cooperate, with each responsible for computing a segment of the
path. To preserve confidentiality of topology with each AS, the PCE
Communications Protocol (PCEP) [RFC5440] supports a mechanism to hide
the contents of a segment of a path, called the Confidential Path
Segment (CPS), by encoding the contents as a Path Key Subobject (PKS) [PCE-PKS].
[RFC5520].

This document defines RSVP-TE protocol extensions necessary to
support the use of Path Key Subobjects in MPLS and GMPLS signaling by
including them in Explicit Route Objects (EROs) and Record Route
Object (RROs) so as to facilitate confidentiality in the signaling of
inter-domain TE LSPs.

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1.2. Usage Scenario

Figure 1 shows a simple network constructed of two ASes. An LSP is
desired from the ingress in AS-1 to the egress in AS-2. As described
in [RFC4655], the ingress Label Switching Router (LSR) acts as a Path
Computation Client (PCC) and sends a request to its PCE (PCE-1).
PCE-1 can compute the path within AS-1, AS-1 but has no visibility into
AS-2. So PCE-1 cooperates with PCE-2 to complete the path
computation.

However, PCE-2 does not want to share the information about the path
across AS-2 with nodes outside the AS. So, as described in
[PCE-PKS],
[RFC5520], PCE-2 reports the AS-2 path segment using a PKS rather
than the explicit details of the path.

PCE-1 can now return the path to be signaled to the ingress LSR in a
path computation response with the AS-2 segment still hidden as a
PKS.

In order to set up the LSP, the ingress LSR signals using RSVP-TE and
encodes the path reported by PCE-1 in the Explicit Route Object
(ERO). This process is as normal for RSVP-TE, RSVP-TE but requires that the
PKS is also included in the ERO ERO, using the mechanisms defined in this
document.

When the signaling message (the RSVP-TE Path message) reaches ASBR-2
(Autonomous System Border Router), it consults PCE-2 to 'decode' the
PKS and return the expanded explicit path segment to ASBR-2. (The
information that PCE-2 uses to decode the PKS is encoded within the
PKS itself.) The PKS is replaced in the ERO with the expanded
information about the path.

----------------------------- ----------------------------
| AS-1 | | AS-2 |
| | | |
| ------- | | ------- |
| | PCE-1 |<---------------+--+-->| PCE-2 | |
| ------- | | ------- |
| ^ | | ^ |
| | | | | |
| v | | v |
| ------- ---- | | ---- |
| | PCC | - - |ASBR| | | |ASBR| - - ------ |
| |Ingress|--|A|--|B|--| 1 |-+--+-| 2 |--|C|--|D|--|Egress| |
| ------- - - ----- | | ---- - - ------ |
| | | |
----------------------------- ----------------------------

Figure 1 : 1: A Simple network Network to demonstrate Demonstrate the use Use of the PKS

2. Terminology

CPS: Confidential Path Segment. A segment of a path that contains
nodes and links that the AS policy requires to not be disclosed
outside the AS.

PCE: Path Computation Element: an Element. An entity (component, application application, or
network node) that is capable of computing a network path or
route based on a network graph and applying computational
constraints.

PKS: Path Key Subobject. A subobject of an Explicit Route Object
which
that encodes a CPS, CPS so as to preserve confidentiality.

3. RSVP-TE Path Key Subobject

The Path Key Subobject (PKS) may be carried in the Explicit Route
Object (ERO) of a an RSVP-TE Path message [RFC3209]. The PKS is a fixed-
length
fixed-length subobject containing a Path Key and a PCE-ID. PCE ID. The Path
Key is an identifier, identifier or token used to represent the CPS within the
context of the PCE identified by the PCE-ID. PCE ID. The PCE-ID PCE ID identifies
the PCE that can decode the Path Key using a reachable IPv4 or IPv6
address of the PCE. In most cases, the decoding PCE is also the PCE
that computed the Path Key and the associated path. Because of the
IPv4 and IPv6 variants, two subobjects are defined as follows.

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L| Type | Length | Path Key |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PCE ID (4 bytes) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

The L bit SHOULD NOT be set, so that the subobject represents a
strict hop in the explicit route.

Type

Subobject Type for a Path Key with a 32-bit PCE ID as assigned by
IANA.

Length

The Length contains the total length of the subobject in bytes,
including the Type and Length fields. The Length is always 8.

PCE ID

A 32-bit identifier of the PCE that can decode this key. The
identifier MUST be unique within the scope of the domain that the
CPS crosses, crosses and MUST be understood by the LSR that will act as
PCC for the expansion of the PKS. The interpretation of the
PCE-ID PCE
ID is subject to domain-local policy. It MAY be an IPv4 address
of the PCE that is always reachable, reachable and MAY be an address that is
restricted to the domain in which the LSR that is called upon to
expand the CPS lies. Other values that have no meaning outside
the domain (for example, the Router ID of the PCE) MAY be used to
increase security or confidentiality.

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L| Type | Length | Path Key |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PCE ID (16 bytes) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L

As above.

Type

Subobject Type for a Path Key with a 128-bit PCE ID as assigned
by IANA.

Length

The Length contains the total length of the subobject in bytes,
including the Type and Length fields. The Length is always 20.

PCE ID

A 128-bit identifier of the PCE that can decode this key. The
identifier MUST be unique within the scope of the domain that the
CPS crosses, crosses and MUST be understood by the LSR that will act as
PCC for the expansion of the PKS. The interpretation of the
PCE-ID PCE
ID is subject to domain-local policy. It MAY be an IPv6 address
of the PCE that is always reachable, but and MAY be an address that
is restricted to the domain in which the LSR that is called upon
to expand the CPS lies. Other values that have no meaning
outside the domain (for example, the IPv6 TE Router ID) MAY be
used to increase security (see Section 5). 4).

Note: The twins of these sub-objects are carried in PCEP messages as
defined in [PCE-PKS]. [RFC5520].

3.1. Explicit Route Object Processing Rules

The basic processing rules of an ERO are not altered. Refer to
[RFC3209] for details. In particular, an LSR is not required to
"look ahead" in the ERO beyond the first subobject that is non-local.

[PCE-PKS]

[RFC5520] requires that any path fragment generated by a PCE that
contains a PKS is be such that the PKS is immediately preceded by an a
subobject that identifies the head end of the PKS (for example, an
incoming interface, interface or a node ID). This rule is extended to the PKS
in the ERO so that the following rules are defined.

- If an LSR receives a Path message where the first subobject of the
ERO is a PKS, it MUST respond with a PathErr message carrying the
error code/value combination "Routing Problem"/"Bad Problem" / "Bad initial
subobject".

- If an LSR strips all local sub-objects from an ERO carried in a
Path message (according to the procedures in [RFC3209]) and finds
that the next subobject is a PKS PKS, it MUST attempt to resolve the
PKS to a CPS.

Resolution of the PKS MAY take any of the following forms or use
some other technique subject to local policy and network
implementation.

o The LSR can use the PCE-ID PCE ID contained in the PKS to contact the
identified PCE using PCEP [RFC5440] and request that the PKS be
expanded.

o The LSR can contact any PCE using PCEP [RFC5440] to request that
the PKS be expanded expanded, relying on cooperation between the PCEs.

o The LSR can use the information in the PKS to index a CPS
previously supplied to it by the PCE that originated the PKS.

If a CPS is derived, the path fragment SHOULD be inserted into the
ERO of the Path message as a direct replacement for the PKS. Other
processing of the CPS and ERO are permitted as described in
[RFC3209].

This processing can give rise to the following error cases:

- PCE-ID

o PCE ID cannot be matched to a PCE to decode the PKS.

The LSR sends a PathErr message with the error code "Routing
Problem" and a the new error value "Unknown PCE-ID PCE ID for PKS
expansion" (see Section 6.3).

o PCE identified by the PCE-ID PCE ID cannot be reached.

The LSR sends a PathErr message with the error code "Routing
Problem" and a the new error value "Unreachable PCE for PKS
expansion" (see Section 6.3).

o The PCE is unable to decode the PKS, perhaps because the Path Key
has expired.

The LSR sends a PathErr message with the error code "Routing
Problem" and a the new error value "Unknown Path Key for PKS
expansion" (see Section 6.3).

o PKS cannot be decoded for policy reasons.

The LSR sends a PathErr message with the error code "Policy
Control Failure" and the error value "Inter-domain policy
failure".

o Addition of CPS to ERO causes Path message to become too large.

The LSR MAY replace part of the ERO with loose hops [RFC3209] or
with a further PKS PKS, according to local policy policy, if the loss in of
specifics within the explicit path is acceptable. If the LSR is
unable to take steps to reduce the size of the ERO ERO, it MUST send
a PathErr message with the error code "Routing Problem" and a the
new error value "ERO too large for MTU" (see Section 6.3).

- An LSR that is called on to process a PKS within an ERO, ERO but that
does not recognize the subobject subobject, will react according to [RFC3209]
and send a PathErr message with the error code/value combination
"Routing Problem"/"Bad Problem" / "Bad Explicit Route Object".

3.2. Reporting Path Key Segments in Record Route Objects

The Record Route Object (RRO) is used in RSVP-TE to record the route
traversed by an LSP. The RRO may be present on a Path message and on
a Resv message. The intention of [RFC3209] is that an RRO on a Resv
message that is received by an ingress LSR is suitable for use as an
ERO on a Path message sent by that LSR to achieve an identical LSP.

The PKS offers an alternative that can be more useful to diagnostics.
When the signaling message crosses a domain boundary, the path
segment that needs to be hidden (that is, a CPS) MAY be replaced in
the RRO with a PKS. In the case of an RRO on a Resv message, the PKS
used SHOULD be the one originally signaled in the ERO of the Path
message. On a Path message, the PKS SHOULD identify the LSR
replacing the CPS, CPS and provide a Path Key that can be used to expand
the path segment. In the latter case, the Path Key and its expansion
SHOULD be retained by the LSR that performs the substitution for at
least the lifetime of the LSP. In both cases, the expansion of the
PKS SHOULD be made available to diagnostic tools under the control of
local policy.

4. Security Considerations

The protocol interactions required by the mechanisms described in
this document are point to point point-to-point and can be authenticated and made
secure as described in [RFC5440] and [RFC3209]. The protocol
interactions for PCEP are listed in [PCE-PKS], [RFC5520], while general
considerations for securing RSVP-TE in MPLS-TE and GMPLS networks can
be found in [MPLS-SEC].

Thus, the security issues can be dealt with using standard techniques for
securing and authenticating point-to-point communications. In
addition, it is RECOMMENDED that the PCE providing a PKS expansion
checks
check that the LSR that issued the request for PKS expansion is the
head end of the resulting CPS.

Further protection can be provided by using a PCE ID to identify the
decoding PCE that is only meaningful within the domain that contains
the LSR at the head of the CPS. This may be either an IP address
that is only reachable from within the domain, domain or some non-address
value. The former requires configuration of policy on the PCEs, PCEs; the
latter requires domain-wide policy.

The following specific security issues need to be considered.

- Confidentiality of the CPS. The question to be answered is whether
other network elements can probe a PCE for the expansion of PKSs,
possibly generating path keys Path Keys at random. This can be protected
against by only allowing PKS expansion to be successfully completed
if requested by the LSR that is at the head end of the resulting
CPS. Under specific circumstances, PKS expansion might also be
allowed by configured management stations.

The CPS itself may be kept confidential as it is exchanged in the
PCEP and RSVP-TE protocols using standard security mechanisms
defined for those protocols.

- Determination of information by probing. In addition to the
probing described above, a node might deduce information from the
error responses that are generated when PKS expansion fails as
described in Section 3.1. Any LSR that considers determines that supplying
one of the detailed error codes described in Section 3.1 might
provide too much information that could be used as part of a
systematic attack, attack MAY simply use the error code/value "Policy
Control Failure"/ Failure" / "Inter-domain policy failure" in all cases.

- Authenticity of the path key. Path Key. A concern is that the path key Path Key in
the PKS will be altered or faked faked, leading to erroneous path key Path Key
expansion and the use of the wrong CPS. The consequence would be a bad
ERO in a Path message message, causing the LSP to be set up incorrectly and
resulting in incorrect network resource usage, diversion of traffic
to where it can be intercepted, or failure to set up the LSP.
These problems can be prevented by protecting the protocol
exchanges in PCEP and RSVP-TE using the security techniques
described in [RFC5440], [RFC3209], and [MPLS-SEC].

- Resilience to DoS denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. A PCE can be
attacked through a flood of
path key Path Key expansion requests - -- this
issue is addressed in [PCE-PKS] [RFC5520] and is out of scope for this
document. A further attack might consist of sending a flood of
RSVP-TE Path messages with deliberately spurious PKSs. This attack
is prevented by ensuring the integrity of the Path messages using
standard RSVP-TE security
mechanisms, mechanisms and by enforcing the RSVP-TE chain of trust
chain-of-trust security model.

5. Manageability Considerations

5.1. Control of Function Through through Configuration and Policy

Policy forms an important part of the use of PKSs in EROs and RROs.
There are local and domain-wide policies that SHOULD be available for
configuration in an implementation.

- Handling of an ERO containing a PKS. As described in Section 3.1 3.1,
an LSR that receives a Path message containing a PKS can be
configured to reject the Path message according to policy.

- Handling of PKS requests at a PCE. As described in Section 3.1, in
[PCE-PKS],
[RFC5520], and in [RFC5394] [RFC5394], a PCE can be configured with policy
about
regarding how it should handle requests for PKS expansion.

- PKS expansion. Section 3.1 explains that the PKS can be expanded
by the local LSR, the specific PCE identified in the PKS, any PCE
acting as a proxy, or by some other method. The behavior of the
LSR needs to be locally configurable, configurable but is subject to the domain-wide domain-
wide policy.

- Interpretation of PCE-ID. PCE ID. The interpretation of the PCE-ID PCE ID
component of PKSs is subject to domain-local policy and needs to be
configurable as such. See Section 3 and Section 4 for the options.

- ERO too large. The behavior of an LSR when it finds that adding a
CPS to the ERO causes the Path message to be too large, large is an
implementation choice. However, implementations may choose to
provide configuration of behavior as described in Section 3.1.

- Masking of RRO. As described in Section 3.2, a border router can
choose to mask segments of the path by replacing them with PKSs.
This behavior needs to be configurable configurable, with the default being to
not hide any part of the RRO.

- Inspection / decode decoding of PKS by diagnostic tools. A PCE can allow
access from management or diagnostic tools to request the expansion
of a PKS. Note that this must be regulated with the security and
confidentiality behavior described in Section 4.

- Hiding of reason codes. An LSR can support the configuration of
local policy to hide reason codes associated with the failure to
expand a PKS, and PKS and, as described in Section 4, report all errors as
policy failures.

The treatment of a path segment as a CPS, and its substitution in a
PCRep ERO with a PKS, is a PCE function and is described in
[PCE-PKS].
[RFC5520].

6. IANA considerations Considerations

6.1. Explicit Route Object Subobjects

IANA maintains a registry called "Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP) Parameters" with a subregistry called "Class Names, Class
Numbers, and Class Types".

Within this subregistry subregistry, there is a definition of the EXPLICIT_ROUTE
object with Class Number 20. The object definition lists a number of
acceptable sub-objects for the Class Type 1.

IANA is requested to allocate has allocated two further sub-objects as described in Section 3.
The resulting entry in the registry should look is as follows.

20 EXPLICIT_ROUTE [RFC3209]
Class Types or C-Types:
1 Type 1 Explicit Route [RFC3209]
Sub-object type
64 Path Key with 32-bit PCE ID [This.I-D] [RFC5553]
65 Path Key with 128-bit PCE ID [This.I-D] [RFC5553]

Note well: [PCE-PKS] [RFC5520] defines the PKS for use in PCEP. IANA is
requested to assign has
assigned the same sub-object numbers for use in RSVP-TE as are
assigned for the PKS in PCEP. The numbers suggested above are the same as are suggested in [PCE-PKS].
[RFC5520].

6.2. Record Route Objects Subobjects

IANA maintains a registry called "Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP) Parameters" with a subregistry called "Class Names, Class
Numbers, and Class Types".

Within this subregistry subregistry, there is a definition of the ROUTE_RECORD
object (also known as the RECORD_ROUTE object) with Class Number 21.
The object definition lists a number of acceptable sub-objects for
the Class Type 1.

IANA is requested to allocate has allocated two further sub-objects as described in Section 3.
The resulting entry in the registry should look is as follows.

21 ROUTE_RECORD [RFC3209]
(also known as RECORD_ROUTE)
Class Types or C-Types:
1 Type 1 Route Record [RFC3209]
Sub-object type
64 Path Key with 32-bit PCE ID [This.I-D] [RFC5553]
65 Path Key with 128-bit PCE ID [This.I-D] [RFC5553]

Note well: IANA is requested to use the same sub-object numbers as
are defined for the EXPLICIT_ROUTE object in Section 6.1.

6.3. Error Codes and Error Values

IANA maintains a registry called "Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP) Parameters" with a subregistry called "Error Codes and
Globally-Defined Error Value Sub-Codes".

Within this subregistry subregistry, there is a definition of the "Routing
Problem" error code with error code value 24. The definition lists a
number of error values that may be used with this error code.

IANA is requested to allocate has allocated further error values for use with this error value code
as described in Section 3.1. The resulting entry in the registry should look is
as follows.

24 Routing Problem [RFC3209]

This Error Code has the following globally-defined globally defined Error
Value sub-codes:

31 = Unknown PCE-ID PCE ID for PKS expansion [This.ID] [RFC5553]
32 = Unreachable PCE for PKS expansion [This.ID] [RFC5553]
33 = Unknown Path Key for PKS expansion [This.ID] [RFC5553]
34 = ERO too large for MTU [This.ID]

The values shown above are suggested values. [RFC5553]

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3209] Awduche, D., Berger, L., Gan, D., Li, T., Srinivasan, V. V.,
and G. Swallow, "RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP
Tunnels", RFC 3209, December 2001.

[RFC3473] Berger, L., et al. "GMPLS Singaling RSVP-TE extensions",
RFC3473, Ed., "Generalized Multi-Protocol Label
Switching (GMPLS) Signaling Resource ReserVation
Protocol-Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE) Extensions", RFC
3473, January 2003.

7.2. Informational Informative References

[RFC4655] Farrel, A., Vasseur, J.P., J.-P., and J. Ash, J., "Path "A Path
Computation Element (PCE) (PCE)-Based Architecture", RFC 4655,
August 2006.

[RFC4726] Farrel, A., Vasseur, J.P., J.-P., and A. Ayyangar, A., "A Framework
for Inter-Domain Multiprotocol Label Switching Traffic
Engineering", RFC 4726, November 2006.

[RFC5394] Bryskin, I., Papadimitriou, D., Berger, L. L., and J. Ash, J.,
"Policy-Enabled Path Computation Framework", RFC 5394,
December 2008.

[RFC5440] J.P. Vasseur, et al., JP., Ed., and JL. Le Roux, Ed., "Path Computation
Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440,
March 2009.

[MPLS-SEC] Fang, L., et al., "Security Framework for MPLS and GMPLS
Networks", draft-ietf-mpls-mpls-and-gmpls-security-
framework, work in progress.

[PCE-PKS]

[RFC5520] Bradford, R., Ed., Vasseur, J.P., JP., and A. Farrel, A.,
"Preserving Topology Confidentiality in Inter-Domain Path
Computation Using a Key-Based Path-Key-Based Mechanism", draft-ietf-pce-path-key,
work in progress.

8. Authors' Addresses: RFC 5520,
April 2009.

[MPLS-SEC] Fang, L., Ed., "Security Framework for MPLS and GMPLS
Networks", Work in Progress, March 2009.

Authors' Addresses

Adrian Farrel
Old Dog Consulting
EMail: adrian@olddog.co.uk

Rich Bradford
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1414 Massachusetts Avenue
Boxborough, MA - 01719
USA
Email:
EMail: rbradfor@cisco.com

Jean-Philippe Vasseur
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1414 Massachusetts Avenue
Boxborough, MA - 01719
USA
Email:
EMail: jpv@cisco.com

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